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ABSTRACTS OF-RECENT DECISIONS

Benjamin M. Quigg, Jr.
ADMINISTRATIVE .LAW - FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION RIGHT OF
COMPETITOR TO INTERVENE IN PROCEEDINGS FOR INVESTIGATION OF GAS
0

RATEs -In a proceeding before the Federal· Power Commission for investigation of gas rates of Cities Service Gas Company, petitioners ( competing coal
companies) asked for leave to intervene and to preseht evidence showing the
economic effect a reduction of gas rates would have on the demand for petitioners' coal. The application to intervene was denied, and petitioners appeal
therefrom. Held, appeal dismissed. The right of petitioners to intervene depends entirely upon whether under the statute 1 the matter which- they wish to
present is a factor which must be considered by the commission in its rate determination. The statute provides that in its fixing of rates and charges the
commission may give consideration t~ the cost of the property of the gas company, the depreciation thereof,, and other factors which may bear upon the fair
value of such property,-but nowhere in the act is it suggested that the effect of
a gas rate upon a competing fuel industry may be considered in a proceeding for
the establishment of a -gas rate. The petitioners are therefore without right under
the act to intervene. Alston Coal Co. v. Federal Power Commission, (C. C. A.

10th, 1943) 137 F. (2d) 740.
AssIGNMENT ..,_EFFECT OF PARTIAL AssIGNMENT OF FUTURE WAGES -

Employees of plaintiff received treatment at defendant hospital, and as evidence of their indebtedness to defendant, executed partial assignments of their
future wages. These assignments were represented by notes, to which were attached instruments assigning varying sums out of wages to be applied each week
or month on the notes. These sums varied from one dollar per week to ten dollars per month. Plaintiff has refused to accept the assignments or to make deductions from employees' wages; and plaintiff now brings this action to enjoin
defendants from demanding the acceptance by plaintiff of the assignments, and
from proceeding to enforce upon plaintiff any liability thereon. The injunction
was granted and defendant appeals. Held, judgment affirmed. Partial assignments of a chose in action are recognized as an equitable assignment thereof, and
the assignee will be protected so long as the enforcement of the assignment does
not wor~ a substantial hardship upon the debtor. Under the particular facts of
the present case (i.e. the shortage of office workers, burden of clerical work
imposed by government taxes and social security law, the long periods over which
deductions would be required to be made, and the liability which would be imposed on plaintiff for deductions wrongfully made) the court found that enforcement of the assignments would be a substantial hardship on the plaintiff,
subjecting it to expense and risk which should be properly borne by defendant,
and imposing upon plaintiff tasks which could be easily performed by a collec1

52 Stat. L. 821 §§ 4, S & 6 (1938).
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tor employed by defendant. Orr Cotton Mills v. St. Mary's Hospital (S. C.,
1943) 26 S. E. (2d) 408.1
CONTEMPT - A CASE 1s "PENDING" IN A TRIAL COURT So As To MAKE
PossIBLE A CoNTEMPT OF THAT CouRT WHILE THE CASE rs PENDING IN
HIGHER COURT ON APPEAL - Petitioner Berlandi had been convicted of larceny in the municipal court of the city of Boston; the following day, after appeal
had been filed in the superior court, petitioner Walkins met the chief justice in the
court room, made certain false representations to him, and asked that Berlandi
be allowed to withdraw his appeal and that the finding of guilty be revoked. 1
The chief justice charged the petitioners with criminal contempt in conspiring
and attempting to impede the administration of justice by seeking to secure the
release of a person known to them to be guilty. Upon hearing, the petitioners
were convicted of criminal contempt, and they now present petitions for writ of
error. The contention of petitioners is, inter alia, that the jurisdiction of the
municipal court to convict them for criminal contempt had terminated because
at the time of the alleged representations the case against Berlandi was not
"pending" in the municipal court, there having been already a conviction against
him in that court and an appeal pending in the superior court; and they further
contend that it was too early for the jurisdiction of the court to again attach,
there having been no revival thereof by a withdrawal of the appeal under the
statute. Held, conviction affirmed. "It is possible very effectually to poison the
flow of the fountain of justice before it begins to flow," and for that reason the
power to punish for contempt should arise early in a case. At the time of the
alleged representations the case against Berlandi was pending in the municipal
court as shown by two lines of reasoning: first, there was an alternative of leaving the case in the superior court for disposition of the appeal if the attempt to
exercise improper influence in the municipal court failed, but the withdrawal
of the appeal and revival of the jurisdiction of the municipal court was an essential element 6£ the conspiracy-it was not too early to "poison the fountain of
justice" with respect to the disposition of the case in the municipal court;
second, there remained in the municipal court a specific jurisdiction of this case
concurrent with the jurisdiction of the superior court, a jurisdiction which could
be invoked as of right by the convicted party, and the attempt to improperly influence the court was made in anticipation of invoking such jurisdiction. The
specific case was therefore "pending" in the municipal court for the purpose of
withdrawal of the appeal as a preliminary step toward final disposition of the
case in that court. Berlandi v. Commonwealth, (Mass., 1943) 50 N. E. (2d)
210.
1
Cf. "Enforceability in Equity of Partial Wage Assignments," 40 M1cH. L. REv.
455 (1942); cf. generally annotation on enforceability in equity of assignment of part
of a debt without the debtor's consent, So A. L. R. 413 ( I 93 2).

1
Mass. Gen. L. (1932) (Ter. Ed.) c. 278 § 25, as amended by Mass. Laws,
1937, c. 11. Municipal Court has jurisdiction to receive the personal withdrawal of
the appeal of a person convicted and to determine whether to "order the appellant to
comply with the sentence appealed from" or to "revise or revoke" the sentence imposed.
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CoRPORATIONs - PowER OF DIRECTORS TO RESCIND OR MoDIFY AcTI0N CALLING STOCK FOR REDEMPTION -On April 30, 1943, the board of
directors of defendant company, pursuant to provision of the articles of incorporation, adopted a resolution calling the entire outstanding class A common
stock for redemption on July 1, and the officers of the corporation were directed
to deposit the necessary funds with the rf:demption agent. On June _I 6 the directors adopted a resolution modifying their previous action and c;hanging the call
for redemption from a mandatory to an optional one. Plaintiff is a holder of
shares of class B common stock, which by the charter is subject to preference and
_priorities accorded to the class A stock as to dividends and liquidation, and is
further subject to certain rights in the class A stock of conditional joint control of management. Plaintiff denies the power of the directors to modify its
action of April 30, and brings this declaratory judgment action for a determination in respect thereto. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Held,
reversed; the resolution of April 30 materially changed the entire corporate
structure, and the substantial advantage in-the elimination of class A preferences
and management control thereby accrued to the class B. stockholders. The resolution was unconditional in form and immediately created vested rights in both
class A and class B stockholders. The charter provision permitting redemption
was in the nature of a continuing option which required only the action of the
directors to make a binding contract; that action having been taken the class A
stockholders became creditors and the class B stockholders were irrevocably
freed from existing restrictions and preferences. That being so, the directors
could not withdraw or cancel or modify their action to the prejudice or detriment of class B stockholders. Taylor v. Axto~Fisher Tobacco Co. (Ky.;
1 943) 173 S. W. (2d) 377.1
COURTS-MAY JUDGE BE COMPELLED TO DECIDE CASES WITHIN A
GIVEN TIME WHERE HE HAs UNREASONABLY DELAYED? - In action of
, original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 1 the Attorney General filed a petition for a writ of mandamus against the three judges of the courts
of common pleas of W. County to decide certain cases long pending in that court.
All of the judges filed answers, two of which were not challenged by the Attorney
General,, but to the third reply filed by Judge K. (in which the judge merely
averred "his failure to dispose of said cases was and is due to his ill health") was
filed a demurrer. The court adjudged this latter defense to be properly demurrable, the averment of "illness" being too indefinite and uncircumstantial to
constitute a well-pleaded defense. The court took judicial notice of the nature
of this "illness" and found it. to be no excuse for failure fo perform the duties of
office. A preemptory writ of mandamus was directed to issue forthwith ordering
Judge K. to consider, adjudicate, and submit to the court en bane of W. County
within sixty days decisions in twenty-five cases theretofore assigned to him. Commonwealth v. Keenan, (Pa., 1943) 33 A. (2d) 244.2
1

Cf. generally "Dividend Rules and Mistaken Precedent,"

I

8 lNn. L.

J.

II I

(1943).
As provided in Pa. St. Const. Art. 5 § 3; 12 Pa. St: § 1914.
Cf. annotation on contempt for disobedience of mandamus by judges and clerks
of court, 30 A. L. R. 150 (1924).
1

2
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DECEDENTS' ESTATES - PERS.ONAL IT INSUFFICIENT TO p AY DEBTS HEIR OR DEVISEE ENTITLED TO RENT FROM LAND UNTIL SOLD TO PAY
DEBTS - Certain lands were devised by testatrix as part of her residuary estate
to nieces and nephews. The will further provided for payment of debts and
funeral expenses, and also gave the executor the power to sell the real estate. The
orphans' court in 1937 decreed the estate to be insolvent or likely to become insolvent, but there has been no sale or order for sale of the land, and in the
meantime the administrator c.t.a. has been collecting rents therefrom. The orphans' court has decreed that such rents were the property of the devisees and
unavailable to pay testatrix's debts. The propriety of this decree was the only
question argued on appeal. Held, decree affirmed. Rents are an incident of land,
and at the death of the owner go with the land to his heirs or devisees. Even
though the personal estate of decedent is insufficient to pay debts, the heir or
devisee is entitled to the rents until the land is actually sold; and the existence
of the power of sale given by the will, at least until the exercise thereof, does
not affect the rights of the devisees. This follows from the fact that the land
is not an asset in the hands of executors or administrators, but is merely held
as agent for heirs and devisees-it must first be sold and then the proceeds will
be considered as an asset for payment of debts. The direction in the will for the
payment of debts creates an equitable lien upon testatrix's estate which creditors
may enforce in the event there is insufficient personalty to pay debts, but this
charge does not make the lands an asset in the hands of the administrator, and
until the creditor enforces his lien the income therefrom belongs to the devisee.
In re Boyle's Estate, (N.J. Prerog. 1943) 30 A. (2d) 827.1
GIFTS- NoN-TRANSFERABLE UNITED STATES PosTAL SAVINGS CERTIFICATES ARE PROPER SUBJECTS OF GIFT CAUSA MoRTIS - By stipulation of the
parties it is agreed that the postal savings certificates in question were delivered
under such circumstances as to constitute a valid gift causa mortis, provided that
such certificates could be made the subject of a gift causa mortis. The contention
of plaintiff that the certificates could not be the subject of a valid gift was based
on provisions of the certificates that they were "not transferable" and "not
negotiable." Plaintiff sues as administrator of the alleged donor to recover
possession of the certificates; the circuit court dismissed the petition, and on appeal it was held, affirmed. Any chose in action which creates a liability against
a third person, and which is held by the donor and is his property, whether legal
or equitable, is the subject of a valid gift causa mortis by mere delivery. The
fact that an instrument is "not negotiable" does not prevent assignment thereof,
but merely makes recovery by the assignee subject to any intervening equities.
Neither does the use of the words "not transferable" affect the title, or right
of possession, or validity of any transfer--such provisions have effect only as
regards liability of the government for payment. The judge of the circuit court
had obtained a ruling from the Postmaster General stating that the department
would make payment of the proceeds of postal savings certificates to any person
found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be donee of a valid gift causa
1 Cf. "Probate and Administration: Disposition of Rents and Profits of Realty,"
MoNT. L. REv. 148 (Spring, 1941). Cf. also WoERNER,_THE AMERICAN LAW OF
ADMINISTRATION, 3rd ed., §§ 337, 338, 463, 464, (1923).
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mortis of the certificates; and inasmuch as postal regulations would be no bar
to ~efendant's recovery on the certificates, judgment for defendant donee was
affirmed. Blair v. Kirchner (Ill. App., 1943) 49 N.E. (2d) 292.
INSURANCE - COMFUTATION OF TIME OF DURATION OF AN ACCIDENT
INSURANCE PoLICY - Plaintiff had obtained judgment in the sum of $ I 0,000
against defendant for injuries sustained in an automobile accident occurring at
II :30 P.M. March 6, 1935. M Insurance Company had issued a policy of
liability insurance to defendant, and plaintiff obtained leave to make insurance
company a new party defendant and then filed a supplemental petition asking a
judgment against the company for $5,000, the amount of the policy, in partial
satisfaction of the judgment already obtained against· principal defendant. The
insurance company denied liability, inter alia, on the ground that the policy had
expired at twelve o'clock noon, March 6, 1935, it having become effective, by
its terms, at twelve o'clock noon on September 6, 1934, to continue in full
force and effect for the term of six months.1 Judgment for plaintiff in accordance with supplemental petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed; and the insurance company's motion to certify the record having been allowed the case
came before the supreme court for review. Held, judgment affirmed by a three
to two decision. In accordance with the general rule that all doubts and ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the insured, and the company having
failed to specify the hour a't which the insurance was to expire, the court held
that the policy continued in effect unn1 midnight of March 6, 1935.- Fractions
of a day are not generally considered in the legal computation of time; a contract
which by its terms expires on a c~rtain day remains in force for the whole day,
unless by express wording it is limited to a certain time of day upon which it
expires. Dissent, the fiction of disregarding fractions of a day has no application
where the accrual or termination of rights or liabilities is specifically fixed in terms
of fractions of a day-as was the present case, where the policy was to expire
six months after twelve o'clock noon September 6, 1934. Greulich v. Monnin,
et al, (Ohio, 1943) 50 N.E. (2d) 310.
JUDGMENT-POWER oF EQUITY TO SET AsrnE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
WHERE FAILURE To FILE ANSWER WAS BASED ON MISTAKE OF FACT-In
a prior suit defendant had obtained a default judgment dated December 2 7,
I 940, ( default entered June 4, I 940) against this plaintiff upon an assigned
claim for medical expenses. Thereafter several levies were made upon plaintiff's salary, on ,which collections were made after plaintiff obtained partial release of her wages according to statutory provisions.1 This is a suit in equity
(filed February 24, 1941) to set aside and vacate that default judgment. The
trial court found that within the time allowed for filing her answer in the prior
suit (namely, on May 24, I 940) an answer was mailed to the clerk of the court
Defendant's check for renewal premium was received and accepted by insurance company on March 8, 1935, without notice of cancellation, lapse, or requiring a
one dollar reinstatement fee-thus indicating that compa~y did not consider policy
lapsed.
1

1

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1941) § 690.II.
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and also a copy to the opposing attorney, but both copies were lost in the mails
and plaintiff did not learn of such loss until execution was levied upon her salary
after a default judgment had been takep.; that by reason of such mistaken belief
plaintiff was prevented from interposing a meritorious defense which she had
to said suit; that plaintiff was not negligent in the loss of the answer; that plaintiff was not guilty of !aches; and that defendant had wilfully delayed in the prior
proceeding until plaintiff's rights were barred by lapse of time. Superior court
granted decree vacating the judgment and awarding a money judgment against
defendants for amount colle~ted by levies on plaintiff's sa~aries. Defendants appeal. Held, affirmed; the evidence supports the findings of the trial court.
Failure to prevent the entry of a default judgment clearly was caused by the
mistaken belief that an answer had been filed. From the consequences of such a
mistake of fact, equity will grant relief even though such party was somewhat
negligent ( in this case, in not discovering the failure sooner), so long as the opposing party is not prejudiced by the negligence. In establishing that plaintiff
has a meritorious defense to the default judgment it is ndt necessary to show "an
absolute guarantee of victory;" it is sufficient that proof of the allegations made
would result in a judgment in the trial court which would be more favorable
than the default judgment which was entered. Dissent, mailing is not filing,
and it is the duty of litigants to see that papers are, in fact, filed in the clerk's
office. From such mistakes relief will not be granted unless complainant presents
case with diligence-and diligence does not appear from the facts of this case.
Hallett v. Slaughter (Cal. 1943) 140 P. (2d) 3. 2
JURY-IMPEACHMENT OF VERDICT BY AFFIDAVITS OF JURORS SHOWING
M1scoNDUCT OF BAILIFF - D was convicted of failing to support an illegitimate child; his motion for new trial was overruled, whereupon he made application for rehearing on said motion, stating that he now has learned additional
facts to the effect that, contrary to law, communications had been made to the
jurors by a court bailiff during the jury's deliberations. In support of this application affidavits of three members of the jury were filed showing that when
the foreman informed the bailiff that the jury could not agree, the bailiff replied
"you can't do that. You must reach a decision if you have to stay here for three
months." Thereafter another vote was taken, and a verdict of guilty was returned, one of the jurors testifying that she changed her vote only because she
understood the jury must reach a decision. This conduct of the bailiff was a
violation of his statutory duties,1 and was prejudicial to the defendant. It was
the position of the state that the verdict could not be impeached inasmuch as no
foundation had been laid, as required by the "aliunde rule" which is followed
by this court. The application for rehearing was denied by the trial court, and
said judgment was affirmed by the court of appeals. Held, reversed and remanded for new trial. Under the so-called "aliunde rule" a verdict of a jury
2 Rehearing denied, August 19, 1943. Cf. annotation on relief from default
'judgment where there was failure to appear based on misunderstanding of attorneys,
69 A. L. R. 1136 (1930).
1
Ohio General Code, (Page 1939) § 13448-1. "Such officer or officers (bailiff]
shall not permit a communication to be made to them (the jurors] nor make any himself, except to ask if they have. agreed upon a verdict, unless by order of the court."
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may not be impeached by evidence of a member of the jury unless foundation
for the introduction of such evidence is first laid by competent evidence from
another source. The reason for the adoption of this rule is that a juror comes
into court with bad grace in attempting to prove his misconduct. If such is the
basis for the rule, then there is no basis for its application here where the
testimony is as to events of misconduct of others, which constitute no part of the
jurors' deliberations. State v. Adams (Ohio, 1943) 48 N.E. (2d) 861.2
LABOR LAw - EMPLOYER NoT LIABLE FOR CONTEMPT OF N.L.R.B.
REINSTATEMENT ORDER WHERE No HEARING HAD As TO AMouNT OF
BACK PAY AND Av.A;ILABlLITY OF FoRMER JoBs-C.C.A. HAS JURISDICTION
TO REFER THESE MATTERS BACK TO N.L.R.B. - N.L.R.B. instituted proceedings against respondent for enforcement of its order of June 19, 1942, in
which it found respondent guilty of unlawful discrimination in discharging two
employees on July I I, 1941, and directed reinstatement with back pay. The
only question arises with reference to one employee, concerning whom respondent alleges that since November 22, 1941, it has had no position of the same
grade and seniority available, on which date, by reason of business necessities, it
would have been required to discharge him; respondent therefore denied liability
under the order except from date of discharge to November 22, 1941, and requested a decision by the board upon such evidence before the board should move
to enforce its order. This request of respondent was denied by the board. The
board now attempts to enforce its order, and respondent moves to refer the proceedings back to the board.1 Held, motion granted. Section IO ( e) of the
N.L.R.A. gives the circuit court of appeals jurisdiction to refer back to board any
issues concerning which there is material additional evidence, the failure
to adduce which is considered reasonable; by reason of the board's refusal to
hear evidence the failure to "adduce" was reasonable, and a reference of issues
back to the board is here proper. The approved procedure of the board in regard
to amount of 'back pay ( and presumably with respect to reinstatement orders
also, although no information on this point was submitted to the court) is to
defer the matter until the board's order has been "enforced." As to the amount
of back pay and availability of position for reinstatement the employer must have
opportunity to present evidence to the board, and until such a hearing has been
had the court will not proceed by contempt of an order which does not definitely
prescribe what the employer is to do. The court ordered the questions of reinstatement and back pay referred back to the board to find the facts and to
make an appropriate order, at which time the board may move to make definite
the enforcement order. N.L.R.B. v. New York Merchandise Co., Inc. (C.C.A.
2nd, 1943) 134 F. (2d) 949. 2
2
Cf. Annotation on admissibility of jurors' affidavits to show improper acts of third
persons, 90 A. L. R. 242 (1934); cf. also 31 L. R. A., N. S., 930 (19u).
1

Under§ IO (e) National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. L. 453; 29 U.S. C. A.§
160 (e).
2
Cf. "Reinstatement with Back Pay under the Wagner Act/' 89 UNIV. PA. L.
REv. 648 (1941); cf. generally annotation on computation of back pay 133 A. L. R.
1217 (1941).

•

1943]

RECENT DECISIONS

535

ToRTFEASORS- UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES SUBJECT TO Jo1NT
JUDGMENT - A joint judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff against
defendant railroad companies and defendant city of Cleveland for personal
injuries sustained when automobile in which plaintiff was riding struck a hole
in a street bridge over railroad right of way. The plaintiff charged that city
was liable because of its failure to perform its statutory duty of keeping the
streets in repair; that C railway was liable for failure to keep pavement between
its rails in repair, as required by its franchise contract with the city; and that
N.P. railroad was liable because it failed to keep the bridge in.repair as required
by ordinance. Defendants appeal. HeU, judgment for defendant N.P. railroad, it appearing that no request to repair had been made by the city as required by the ordinance. As to the city and C railway, reversed and remanded.
By reason of failure to perform the obligation of its contract with the city to
keep the pavement between its tracks in repair, a primary liability for injury
rested upon C railway; however, the liability, if any, of the city was secondary,
being predicated upon its statutory duty to keep its streets in repair and free
from nuisance. In order to warrant a joint judgment against tort feasors they
must be in pari delicto as to the tortious act-it is apparent here that there was
no concert of action upon the part of these two defendants resulting in a single
wrongful act, but rather separate wrongful acts, not necessarily concurrently
existing, arising upon a different basis of liability. To allow joint judgments
against parties primarily and secondarily liable would mean that such indemnity
could not be recovered inasmuch as no contribution is allowed between joint
tort feasors who are in pari delicto. Larson v. Cle'Ueland Ry. Co. (Ohio, 1943)
50 N.E. (2d) 163.1
TORTS - MALICIOUS INJURY OF A PERSON IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW Plaintiff's action is based on an alleged conspiracy to ruin plaintiff and drive
him out of the practice of law. The complaint filed sets forth that defendants
filed a fraudulent complaint for disbarment against plaintiff in the Supreme
Court of New Jersey, known to them to be false, charging, inter alia, that plaintiff attempted to unlawfully extort money from defendant; that said complaint
was heard before the Board of Bar Examiners; and that by said board's report
plaintiff was found not guilty of the charges. Malice and lack of reasonable
grounds to believe that the charges were true are alleged by plaintiff, and general damages in the nature of loss of business reputation, mental anguish and
contempt of friends and associates are averred. Defendants interpose motion to
strike the complaint. HeU, motion denied. This is an action on the case setting
forth a malicious conspiracy, the fraudulent disbarment complaint being used to
effect its purpose and to cause damage to plaintiff. The conspiracy is pleaded
merely as aggravating the charge and to enable plaintiff to recover against the
three defendants as joint tort feasors-the gravamen of the charge is acts,
maliciously done, calculated to injure plaintiff in his reputation and business.
1

Cf. generally annotation on joinder in one action at law of persons not jointly
liable, one or the other of whom is liable to the plaintiff, 41 A. L. R. 1216 (1926); also
annotation on joint liability of master and servant for tort of servant, 12 L. R. A.,
N. S., 669 (1908). See "Indemnity Among Joint Tort Feasors," 18 NoTRE DAME
LAw. 36 (1942).
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The right to pursue a lawful business is a property right that the law protects
against unjustifiable interference; and any intentional act which in the ordinary
course would impede the enjoyment of such right is a wrongful invasion and is
treated as tortious. Stein v. Schmitz (N.J. 1943), 32 A (2d) 844.
ToRTS-· REs IPsA LoQUITUR NoT APPLICABLE TO BREAKING OF BEVERAGE BOTTLE IN HANDS OF PURCHASER - On August 3, I 943, two California courts handed down decisions reversing lower court holdings, involving
the same principles of law, and reaching the same result. In one case 1 a fourteen-year-old girl purchased several bottles of chocolate milk fom defendl!nt's
dairy, and while carrying them back to school one of the bottles "just broke"
in her hand. In the second case 2 a coca cola bottle "exploded" in plaintiff's
hand while she was moving some bottles into" the refrigerator from the place
where defendant's driver had. put them. In each of these cases the plaintiff
made no attempt to prove specific facts tending to show either that the bottle
was defective or that defendant was negligent in delivering it in a defective
condition, but based the claim solely on inferences of _negligence and defective
condition merely from the✓ breaking of the bottle. Judgment in each case for
plaintiff had been obtained in the lower court, and defendants appeal from these
judgments. Held, reversed in both cases. The essential elements of a claim
based on res ipsa loquitur are' that the allegedly defective instrumentality must
have been in the exclusive control of the defendant and that the facts proved by
plaintiff admit of the single inference that the accident would not have happened
unless the defendant had been negligent. In both of the present cases the defective
article was out of the physical control of defendants, but by showing no intervening cause, either, in the first case, the hitting together of the milk bottles, or, in
the second case, disturbance of the cases of coca cola after delivery, this objection
is overcome. However, breaking of bottles alone is not sufficient to permit the
inference, of negligence either in failing to discover the defect or in causing it.
In neither case did plaintiff introduce evidence to show that defendant could
have employed means of discovering the flaw more effective than those already
used by them (i.e. approved, modern methods of manufacture and bottling, and
multiple checking), so that from the facts shown there was no basis of an inference of lack of reasonable care. 3 Honea v. City Dairy, Inc., (Cal. 1943) 140
P. (2d) 369; Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, et al (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1943) 140 P. (2d) rn7.
TRIAL-REPETITION OF SAME INSTRUCTION To JuRY Is ERRORPlaintiff recovered a judgment for $5!000 against defendant for personal inHonea v. City Dairy, foe., (Cal. 1943) 140 P. (2d) 369.
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, et al (Cal. Dist. Ct. App., 1943)
140 P. (2d) 107.
3
Cf. generally annotation on applicability of res ipsa loquitur to "explosions" of
bottles 4 A. L. R. 1094 (1920), 8 A. L. R. 500 (1920), 39 A.~- R. 1006 (1925), 56
· A. L. R. 593 (1928), 28 L. R. A., N. S., 949 (1910), and L. R. A. 1916 E, 1094.
Cf. also "Tort Liability of Manufacturers to users of their Goods," 25 MARQUETTE L.
REV. 173 (1941); "Torts-Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine in Bottle Explosion Cases," 3 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 343.
1

2

1943]

RECENT DECISIONS

537

juries alleged to have been sustained as the result of an electric shock. Plaintiff
had offered no evidence tending to show any specific negligence, but relied on
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Defendant appeals from the judgment for plaintiff and assigns as error, inter alia, the repetition of instructions. Ten instruc, tions were given at the request of plaintiff, four of which in almost identical
language advised the jury that they could consider the pain and suffering of
plaintiff, and his expenses, loss of health, etc., in assessing plaintiff's damages.
Held, error; judgment reversed and remanded. The court permits some
latitude in giving sufficient instructions to cover every phase of a damage claim,
but it could see no justification in repeating practically identical instructions on
the subject of damages. O'Hara v. Central Illinois Light Co., (Ill. App. 3rd
Dist., 1943) 49 N.E. (2d) 274.1
TRUSTS - SPENDTHRIFT PROVISIONS SET UP BY TENANTS BY ENTIRETIES FOR THEIR OwN BENEFIT - F and his wife, owners of real estate as
tenants by entireties, executed deed of trust to plaintiff for the use and benefit
of grantors and for survivor of them during their natural lives, so that neither
the property nor income therefrom should be subject to nor liable for debts and
engagements of grantors; the corpus of the trust to be held intact to protect the
interests in remainder which upon the death of both grantors was to pass by conveyance of the trustee to grantors' daughters, with a contingent grant to grandchildren if the daughters or either of them did not survive grantors. Grantors
reserved the right to revoke, alter or amend the trust in part or in its entirety at
anytime. At the time of this conveyance defendant was a judgment creditor of
F, and F's wife having since died defendant has now issued a writ of execution
upon its judgment an4 the premises were exposed to public sale. Plaintiff brings
this action to restrain defendant from proceeding further against the property and
for a declaration clearing cloud cast upon title by defendant's judgment.1 From
a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiff appeals. Held, reversed. It is against public
policy to permit an owner of property to create for his own benefit an interest
in that property which cannot be reached by his creditors. The same contrary
public policy is said to exist in the present case so as to make ineffectual a spendthrift provision imposed by tenants by entireties on a conveyance of a life interest
to themselves also as tenants by entireties. However, creditors may reach such
1
Cf. generally annotation on necessity of repeating definitions of legal or technical
terms, 7 A. L. R. 135 (1920).

1

ln a previous action (C. I. T. Corp. v. Flint, 333 Pa. 350, 5 A. (2d.) 126,
(1939), the present defendant sought to have this conveyance set aside· as void under
Fraudulent Conveyance Act of 1921 (P. L. 1045, 39 P. S. § 351, et seq.); the court
there held that, in as much as the property in question was held by husband and wife
as tenants by entireties, the holder of a judgment against husband held it subject to
possible extinction as a lien either by survival of the wife or by conveyance of the
· parties, and such conveyance would not be a fraud on husband's judgment creditor, he
having never had any right to the property. The conveyance was thus held to be valid,
but the action having been brought under Fraudulent Conveyance Act the court did
not undertake to pass upon the effect of the deed. The present action is brought to
determine the effect of the spendthrift provisions of the deed, now that the husband
has sole ownership of the property for the period of his life.
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trust property only to the extent to which settlor retains an interest in the property; interests created in others may not be reached unless the creation of the trust
was a disposition in fraud of creditors. Inasmuch as the property here in questioh
was not subject to debts of either spoµse, and as tenants by entireties the
owners could convey away their eptire interest in the property without infringing the rights of their individual creditors, the court held that they may convey
away a lesser estate to their daughters (i.e. remainder after grantor's life interest) which may not be reached by creditors of surviving spouse; and the
reservation of the power to revoke the trust, in the absence of the exercise
thereof, does not subject the remainder_ interest to claims of settlor's creditors.
Murphy 'll, C.I.T. Corp., (Pa. 1943) 33 A. (2d) 16.2
2 Cf. annotation on right of individual creditors to property held as tenants by
entireties, IZI A. L. R. 1022 (1939), 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1026 (1907), 42 L. R. A.
(N. S.) SSS (1913).

